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Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
New Weapons, New Penalties, and New Fears
for Providers Created by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA")
Colleen M. Faddick*
INTRODUCrION

Health care fraud and abuse cost an estimated $20 billion to
$100 billion per year.1 With so many government programs vying for limited dollars, it is not surprising that Congress has relented neither in its pursuit of Medicare and Medicaid program
reforms, nor in its desire to severely thwart fraud and abuse in
government health care programs. Thus, Congress passed and
the President signed into law the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 2 substantially increasing the government's tools for detecting and weapons for
fighting fraud and abuse.
The cost of fraud in health care is not only the underlying
theme of federal fraud and abuse attacks, but the basis for expecting large recoveries resulting from expanded government
and private programs to detect fraud and abuse and produce
settlements. However, the new programs under HIPAA come
* Colleen Faddick is an associate in the Health Industry Group of the Houston
office of Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. She received her Bachelor of Arts from the University of Colorado, and her Juris Doctor from the University of Houston Law Center.
The author thanks Donna Clark, of counsel to Vinson & Elkins, for her review and
comments, and Dennis Barry, a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Vmson &
Elkins, for his contribution to this article. Matthew Zagrodzky, J.D., also contributed
to this article.
1. Alwyn Cassill, Cop: Fed FraudPolice Yourself or We'll Get You, AHA NEws,
Feb. 3, 1997, at 1 (stating that the U.S. General Accounting Office estimates health
care fraud and abuse to be as high as 10% of the $1 trillion spent annually on health
care); GAO Official Says Program Fraud Could Be as High as $20 Billion, 3 BNA's
HEALTH CARE DAILY 2, Mar. 5, 1997 (estimating Medicare fraud and waste to range
from $6 billion to $20 billion per year).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
3. Although HIPAA also contains provisions regarding health care insurance access, portability, and renewability, this article focuses only on the numerous sections
of Title II of HIPAA that relate to the prevention of health care fraud and abuse.
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with a substantial price tag. In 1997, the Medicare trust fund is
expected to contain at least $157 million for the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("Secretary" or
"HHS") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to
conduct the various fraud-fighting programs created by
HIPAA.4 Under the new legislation, the fraud-fighting budget
will swell to $310 million by the year 2002, and then level off
thereafter, without any sunset provision. HIPAA also provides
significant funding for the new Medicare Integrity Program for
the private detection of health care fraud, described below. Settlements, criminal fines, civil monetary penalties, and other penalties or damages recovered from individuals and entities
involved in health care fraud and abuse are also to be appropriated into these funds.
The government intends for its well-funded and expanded
fraud and abuse programs to combat health care fraud and
abuse. Although it is difficult to argue with the government's
lofty goal of eradicating fraud and abuse from the health care
system, the practical application of many of HIPAA's provisions
may prove harmful to many health care providers by producing
the unintended consequences of fewer settlements, more court
battles, and the entanglement of the innocent in the intricacies
of the government's new and very broad punishment tools.
This article focuses on three provisions of HIPAA: the expansion of permissive exclusions, the broadened array of civil monetary penalties, and the new health care fraud crimes provisions.
Section I of this article explains the new tools and weapons
available to combat fraud and abuse. Section II describes
HIPAA's creation of new health care fraud crimes, its addition
of permissive exclusion from the federal health care programs
for individuals associated with entities that violate fraud and
abuse laws, and its expansion of civil monetary penalties. 6 Section III outlines the purposes and basic elements of a corporate
compliance plan, a tool that may be useful in preventing or lim4.

For 1997, HIPAA appropriates at least $104 million to the total fraud-fighting

efforts of the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General. At least $60 million is
earmarked for the HHS's Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), and $47 million is

appropriated to the FBI. HIPAA § 201(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c).
5. HIPAA § 201(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i).
6.

HIPAA § 262 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d to 1320d-8) requires all

health care providers and health plans (except worker's compensation plans) to use a
single set of uniform standards for the electronic exchange of health care administrative and financial information.
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iting individual and corporate liability under the fraud and
abuse laws. This article concludes that, while many of the new
provisions of HIPAA are necessary and meaningful to prevent
health care fraud and abuse, the expanded criminal liability and
the broad permissive exclusion provision, coupled with the new
and confusing civil monetary penalties provision, emphasize the
need to mitigate exposure to civil and criminal sanctions.
As of this writing, many commentators have reported that
President Clinton and some members of Congress wish to
amend the Act.7 This article analyzes the law as it stands in
spring 1997.
I.

FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER

HIPAA

HIPAA represents one of the most expansive changes to federal fraud and abuse laws. Some of the more noteworthy
changes include the establishment of three major programs: a
Fraud and Abuse Control Program, a Medicare Integrity Program, and a Beneficiary Incentive Program. In addition,
HIPAA amends the permissive exclusion provisions, provides
certain minimum exclusion periods, expands the scope of civil
monetary penalties, instructs the Secretary to issue advisory
opinions, protects certain risk-sharing arrangements from illegal
remuneration (anti-kickback) penalties, creates new crimes relating to health care fraud, and establishes a data base to house
reports of adverse actions relating to the delivery of health care
services. (The table found in the Appendix to this article summarizes the Act's changes to federal fraud and abuse laws.)
A. Fraud and Abuse Control Program
HIPAA establishes a Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Program ("Control Program") to coordinate federal, state, and
local health care anti-fraud enforcement programs." Specifically, HIPAA funds the Control Program for criminal, civil, and
administrative enforcement; for conducting investigations, financial and performance audits, inspections, and evaluations;
and for establishing and modifying safe harbors, issuing advisory
opinions, and maintaining a public data base. This new Control
7. See, e.g., Roundup: Administration Readies Legislation to Repeal Fraud and
Abuse Provisions,6 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 400 (Mar. 13, 1997); Finance Committee

Witnesses Find Little Consensus on Medicare Budget, 23

HEALTH LEGIS.

&

REG.

WKLY. (Mar. 12, 1997), available in 1997 WL 8740183.

8. HIPAA § 201(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c).
Published by LAW eCommons, 1997
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Program will be jointly administered by the Attorney General
and the Secretary of HHS, acting through the OIG.9 Appropriations from a new Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account, instituted within the Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part
A) Trust Fund, will fund the new program. Fines, penalties, and
other fraud and abuse recoveries are also expected to contribute
to the Control Program's funding. Appropriations for the first
year of the Control Program (fiscal year 1997) may not exceed
$104 million and may be increased by fifteen percent for each
year thereafter through fiscal year 2003, at which point level
funding is expected. 10 Further, appropriations may be made
from the new account to fund the cost of the FBI's activities in
this area.
B. Medicare Integrity Program
The Medicare Integrity Program, established under HIPAA,
authorizes HHS to contract with private companies to carry out
fraud and abuse detection, cost report audits, utilization review,
and provider payment determinations. The Medicare Integrity
Program is also charged with provider, beneficiary, and public
education, as well as the development of a list of durable medical equipment ("DME") items subject to prior HHS payment
authorization." HHS is allowed to remove Medicare 2payment
integrity activities from current Medicare contractors.
HHS is required to issue a proposed ruling with respect to
how it plans to implement the new program. The new rules
were slated for publication during July of 1997, but were not
available as of the date of this writing. The Medicare Integrity
Program will be administered by the Secretary. It will be generously funded by amounts appropriated from the Medicare (Part
A) Trust Fund, receiving in 1997 between $430 million and $440
million, and bulging up to $720 million for each year after
2002.13
9.

On January 24, 1997, HHS released guidelines explaining the program and its
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM AS MANDATED BY THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY & AccOUNTABIL,rry ACT OF 1996 (1997).
10. HIPAA § 201(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i).
11. HIPAA § 202(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd). The DME list is
created by the Secretary and predetermines that payment will not be made for certain
equipment that, in the Secretary's payment experience, is frequently subject to unnecessary utilization. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(15) (1995).
12. HIPAA § 202(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h & 1395u(c)).

goals. U.S.

13.

HIPAA § 201(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i).
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C. Beneficiary Incentive Program
To enlist Medicare beneficiaries and others to help identify
fraud and abuse, HIPAA created the Beneficiary Incentive Program, offering incentive payments to beneficiaries for providing
information that leads to monetary recoveries or other criminal
or civil sanctions under the Medicare program. 14 The Secretary
must establish programs to encourage individuals to report incidents of fraud and abuse against the Medicare program, though
discourage reporting frivolous or irrelevant information,' 5 and
must solicit suggestions from beneficiaries to improve the program's efficiency. 16 To help increase beneficiary awareness of
any potential improprieties, the program requires the Secretary
to provide each beneficiary with an explanation of benefits for
every item or service paid for by Medicare.' 7 Individuals whose
reports lead to the recovery of at least $100 (exclusive of criminal penalties) or efficiency savings may receive a share of the
recovery or savings."'
D. Permissive Exclusion and Minimum Exclusion Periods
As described more fully in section II(A), HIPAA expands the
activities that may form the basis for exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. In addition to the many actions
previously subject to this devastating sanction, exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid is now available for violations of the
new crimes added by HIPAA and convictions for misdemeanor
controlled substance violations, as well as for officers or managing employees of a sanctioned entity and those who control a
sanctioned entity and knew or should have known of the prohibited activity. Minimum periods for certain permissive exclusions
and a mandatory five-year exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid for felony convictions relating to health care fraud and controlled substances replace the Health Care Financing
Administration's prior discretion in setting exclusion periods. 19

14.
15.

HIPAA § 203 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5).
HIPAA § 203(b)(1).

16.

HIPAA § 203(c)(1).

17.
18.
19.

HIPAA § 203(a).
HIPAA § 203(b)(2) & (c)(2).
HIPAA § 211 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7).
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Civil Monetary Penalties

As explained in detail in section II(B) below, Congress expanded the programs subject to civil monetary penalties to include any federally funded or state-funded health care program,
excluding the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan, and made
substantial changes to the civil monetary penalties provisions.2 °
First, HIPAA clarifies the level of intent required for the imposition of civil monetary penalties by adding the requirement that
a person must knowingly 2' present a claim or make misleading
statements to induce payment for a claim that falls within one of
the prohibited categories.
Second, HIPAA increases the maximum civil monetary penalty from $2000 per item or service to $10,000 per item or service.22 Civil monetary penalties may now be assessed for
upcoding, claiming medically unnecessary services or items, or
offering remuneration. The latter includes waiving coinsurance
and deductible amounts or providing free or discounted services
to Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries to influence their choice of
provider, practitioner, or supplier. However, civil monetary
penalties may not be assessed for waiving coinsurance and deductible amounts if the waiver (1) is not routine, (2) is not offered as part of any solicitation or advertisement, (3) was based
on financial need, (4) resulted notwithstanding reasonable collection efforts, or (5) is permitted under current law. Also excluded from the prohibition are differentials in coinsurance and
deductible amounts that constitute a plan's benefit design, such
as a plan incentive designed to promote the delivery of preven-

tive care.23
Third, physicians who falsely certify Medicare beneficiaries
for home health care are subject to a civil monetary penalty of
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1995).
21. HIPAA clarifies that knowledge of information is imposed upon one who
knows or acts on information actually possessed as well as information that should
have been possessed but for the "deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information." HIPAA § 231(d) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1320a-7a(i)(7)). This standard is similar to that required for liability under the federal False Claims Act ("FCA"). For a comparison of the knowledge standards of the
FCA as well as the fraud and abuse prohibitions, see Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and
Water: The Government's Mistaken Use of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in False

Claims Act Prosecutions,6
22.
23.

ANNALs HEALTH

L. 105 (1997).

HIPAA § 231(c) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)).
HIPAA § 231(h) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(i)(6)).
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not more than three times the amount of payments or $5000,
whichever is greater.24
Fourth, those who have a control interest or who are managers or officers of a violating entity may be subject to civil monetary penalties.25
F. Safe Harborsand Advisory Opinions
HIPAA requires the Secretary to establish a procedure to solicit recommendations at least annually, to publish proposals to
modify existing and add new safe harbors under the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act,26 and to issue special
fraud alerts. The Secretary must publish proposed safe harbors
with a sixty-day comment period and may issue final rules implementing new or modifying existing safe harbors as
necessary.27

HIPAA also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General, to issue advisory opinions regarding compliance with the anti-kickback provision. 28 Advisory opinions must
be rendered within sixty days of a request. This provision became effective on February 21, 1997, and will sunset on February
21, 2001. On February 19, 1997, the OIG issued a final interim
rule setting the procedural requirements for issuing advisory
opinions. 29 Although the President's proposed budget for 1998
contains a provision repealing the authority to issue advisory
opinions, 30 the Secretary is moving forward pursuant to
HIPAA's requirements. The advisory opinions will be made
available to the public, although they are binding only on the
Secretary and the requesting party. While advisory opinions regarding the anti-kickback provision are a welcomed addition,
Congress did not require the Secretary to issue advisory opinions about situations with potential implications under the Stark
law, which prohibits self-referrals for certain "designated health
services" paid for by Medicare and Medicaid. In addition, advisory opinions are not available for issues relating to the fair market value of any goods, services, or property, or regarding the
24.

HIPAA § 232 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(3)).

25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra section 1(B).
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1995).
HIPAA § 205 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a)).
HIPAA § 205 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)).

29. 62 Fed. Reg. 7350 (1997) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008).

30. 1998 Budget of the President, Ch. 5, at 52.
Published by LAW eCommons, 1997
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status of an individual as an "employee" as defined in section
3121(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.3'
G. Risk-Sharing Arrangements
HIPAA creates an exception to the anti-kickback provision
for risk-sharing arrangements.3 2 An arrangement for items or
services between a Medicare HMO or Competitive Medical
Plan and an individual or entity does not result in illegal remuneration if the arrangement is pursuant to a written agreement. 33 Also not illegal remuneration are arrangements for
items or services between health plans and an individual or entity if pursuant to a written agreement that places the individual
or entity at substantial financial risk for the costs or utilization
of the items or services that the individual or entity is obligated
to provide. 4 While the exception is in effect, the Secretary has
failed to issue in a timely fashion standards relating to this
amendment.
The Secretary is required to expedite the establishment of
risk-sharing standards through a negotiated rule-making process
in consultation with the Attorney General and other interested
parties, including representatives from the health care industry.
HIPAA requires consideration of the following factors when
creating the new standards: (1) the level of risk appropriate to
the size and type of arrangement, (2) the frequency of assessment and distribution of incentives, (3) the level of capital contribution, and (4) the extent to which the arrangement provides
incentives to control the cost and quality of health care services. 35 In May of 1997, the Secretary issued proposed rules calling for a series of meetings to begin the negotiated rule-making
31. One of the exceptions to the anti-kickback provision is for remuneration paid
by an employer to an employee in a bona fide employment relationship with such
employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). Although status as an employee is crucial
to this exception, that status may be determined only by the Internal Revenue Service
and the Secretary will not issue opinions on that subject.
32. HIPAA § 216 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F)).
33. See Peter A. Pavarini, PhysicianNetworks & Other OrganizationalModels for
Managed Care Contracting,in NATIONAL HEALTH LAW. Ass'N, ALIGNING THE NEw
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Mar. 13-15, 1997).
34. HIPAA does not define substantial financial risk, but leaves the determination
to the Secretary through negotiated rule making with the Attorney General. Congress declined to include in this provision all of the acceptable risk arrangements offered in the House version of the bill, excluding incentive pools and per diem
payments. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 251, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2064.
35. HIPAA § 216(b) (to be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b note).
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process in June, 1997. The Secretary intends to complete the
process and publish interim final rules by year-end 1997.36
H.

Criminal Code Provisions-FederalOffenses Related to
Health Care

By adding new federal crimes, HIPAA criminalizes various
activities relating to health care benefit programs, including
fraud,37 theft or embezzlement,38 false statements,39 obstruction
of criminal investigations, 4° and money laundering. 41 Health
care benefit programs are defined to include any public or private plan or contract, thus providing private payers with additional weapons to fight fraud. 42 Persons and organizations
convicted under these provisions are subject to fines, imprisonment, or both. HIPAA further authorizes investigative demand,
or administrative subpoena, procedures for the Attorney Gen43
eral or the Attorney General's designee, including the FBI,
forfeiture of property,44 injunctive relief,45 and qualified immunity for persons who provide information to law enforcement
officials.46 However, the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
investigate violations related to ERISA plans is not affected by
this provision. 7 HIPAA also establishes a new criminal penalty
for those who knowingly and willfully dispose of assets to gain
eligibility for Medicaid benefits, subjecting them to fines and jail
time if convicted of violating this provision.4
L Data Collection
HIPAA requires the Secretary to establish a national health
care fraud and abuse collection program (to be coordinated with
the National Practitioner Data Bank). Under the collection
program, federal and state government agencies and health
36.
37.

62 Fed. Reg. 28410 (May 23, 1997).
HIPAA § 242 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1347).

38. HIPAA § 243 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 669).
39. HIPAA § 244 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1035).
40.
41.
42.
43.

HIPAA
HIPAA
HIPAA
HIPAA

§ 245
§ 246
§ 241
§ 248

(to
(to
(to
(to

be
be
be
be

codified
codified
codified
codified

at
at
at
at

18
18
18
18

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1518).
§ 1956(a)(1)).
§ 24).
§ 3486).

44. HIPAA § 249 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)).
45. HIPAA § 247 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1)).
46. HIPAA § 248 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(d)).
47. HIPAA § 250. For more information about the Secretary of Labor's ability to
investigate ERISA violations, see 29 U.S.C. § 1134 (1995).
48. HIPAA § 217 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(a)(6)).
Published by LAW eCommons, 1997
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plans must report at least once each month all "final adverse
actions" taken against a health care practitioner, provider, or
supplier. HIPAA defines final adverse actions, as related to the
delivery of items or services, as the following: (1) civil judgments, (2) federal or state criminal convictions, (3) revocation
or suspension of licensure, (4) reprimand, censure, or probation,
(5) exclusion from participation in any federal or state health
program, (6) any other negative action or finding by such federal or state agency that is publicly available, and (7) any other
adjudicated decisions that HHS identifies by regulation.4 9 Federal and state government agencies as well as health plans may
50
tap into the information in the data base for a reasonable fee.
Providers, suppliers, and licensed practitioners may, under regulations to be issued by HHS, request disclosure of their own information, and may dispute the accuracy of the report. HHS is
responsible for establishing procedures designed to protect the
privacy of individuals receiving health care services when disclosures are made under the new reporting system.5 '
II. THE

INTRICACIES OF

HIPAA

Preventing health care fraud and abuse is the theme of a significant portion of HIPAA. As discussed above, several provisions reinforce the government's anti-fraud position and provide
enhanced methods through which the government and private
citizens may wage the war against health care fraud. However,
HIPAA contains three interrelated anti-fraud weapons of particular importance to the government's arsenal against fraudulent
activities. These interrelated weapons, although placed throughout HIPAA, can financially penalize violators through exclusion
from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, increased civil monetary penalties, and criminal prosecution and/
or the imposition of extraordinary fines for violations of the
newly created health care fraud crimes. For example, one act or
omission could subject an individual to prosecution for a fraud
crime, which can result in imprisonment or large fines, which in
turn could cause the individual to be excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which then could cause the individual's employer to be excluded from the programs.
49.
50.
51.

HIPAA § 221(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(g)(1)(A)(i)-(v)).
HIPAA § 221(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(d)).
HIPAA § 221(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(c)).
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Amendments under HIPAA to existing laws have created a variety of permutations.5 2
A.

The Permissive Exclusions: Mandatory Lengths and
Imputed Responsibility

Prior to HIPAA, individuals and entities were subject to
either mandatory or permissive exclusion from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs for any one of fourteen acts or omissions. HIPAA operates to clarify some of those acts, specifying
mandatory exclusion for certain felony convictions and providing for permissive exclusion for misdemeanor convictions and
other activities. Although permissive exclusion for such acts has
been an option for the Secretary of HHS, the period of exclusion was usually left to the Secretary's discretion. Now, a minimum period of exclusion is prescribed for certain offenses,
subject to the Secretary's determination that a shorter or longer
period is appropriate based on mitigating or aggravating circumstances. In addition, as mentioned above, HIPAA expands the
group subject to possible exclusion to include individuals who
control a sanctioned entity.
The new permissive exclusion for individuals who control a
sanctioned entity is intended to provide HHS with a weapon to
penalize individuals who own or operate Medicare- and Medicaid-participating entities that commit acts that subject the entities to various sanctions. Prior to this provision, these
individuals could not be held personally accountable for the actions of the entities they controlled. A sanctioned entity is one
excluded from the Medicare or Medicaid program or convicted
of a felony or misdemeanor relating to Medicare and Medicaid,
patient abuse, health care felony fraud,5 3 or felony manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, or dispensing of a controlled substance. 4 HIPAA subjects an individual to permissive exclusion
if the individual (1) maintained a direct or indirect ownership or
control interest in a sanctioned entity and knew or should have
52. For example, an entity may commit an act for which it may be excluded, prosecuted for health care fraud, and/or assessed a civil monetary penalty, which in turn
may cause an individual(s) associated with the entity to be excluded from Medicare
and Medicaid and be assessed civil monetary penalties. (This scenario is described in

detail in section 1(B) below.) Of course, the sanctions and penalties described above
are in no way exhaustive. Other actions may lie under the anti-kickback provision,
the federal False Claims Act, Stark law, and other federal or state laws.

53. See infra section II(C).
54.

HIPAA § 213 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7).
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known of the action constituting the basis for the sanction, or
(2) was an officer or managing employee 55 of the sanctioned entity, even without a showing of knowledge. The knowledge
standard applicable to those with ownership and control interests charges those who act in deliberate ignorance or in reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information with knowledge of the action; no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required. 6
Although the permissive exclusion for individualswho control
a sanctioned entity is new, the theory of penalizing an individual
or an entity based on a relationship or association with another
individual or entity is well established under the Social Security
Act ("SSA"). 57 Since the 1980s, the government has had the option to exclude an entity that was controlled by a sanctioned in-

dividual 8 However, there are important differences between
the 1980s provision-imputing to the entity the actions of the
individual-and HIPAA's provision-imputing to the individual
the actions of the entity. First, the 1980s provision established a
five percent floor when determining if an individual has a con55. A managing employee is an individual, including a general manager, business
manager, administrator, and director, who exercises operational or managerial control over the entity, or who directly or indirectly conducts the day-to-day operations
of the entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-5(b) (1995).
56. The permissive exclusion provision incorporates the definition of "knows or
should have known" from the civil monetary penalties provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7a(i)(6) (1995). The definition actually appears at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(7) (1995).
This definition follows that of the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)
(1995), where the level of intent required to fall within the provision is civil, and no
proof of specific intent to defraud is required. Absent such clarification, the courts
would be left to determine the applicable level of intent required to exclude an individual from the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-Th(b) (1995) (illegal remuneration or anti-kickback); 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1995) (criminal false claims).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(8) (1995). This section provides permissive exclusion
of:
[a]ny entity with respect to which the Secretary determines that a person(A)(i) who has a direct or indirect ownership or control interest of 5 percent or more in the entity or with an ownership or control interest (as
defined in Section 1320a-3(a)(3) of this title) in that entity, or
(ii) who is an officer, director, agent or managing employee (as defined in
section 1320a-5(b) of this title) of that entityis a person(B)(i) who has been convicted of any offense described in subsection (a)
of this section or in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection;
(ii) against whom a civil monetary penalty has been assessed under section
1320a-7a of this title or [section] 1320a-8 of this title; or
(iii) who has been excluded from participation under Subsection XVIII of
this chapter or under a State health care program.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol6/iss1/5
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trol interest in an entity;59 HIPAA contains no floor. Second,
under the 1980s provision, entities may be excluded based on
the controlling individual's (1) conviction of felony or misdemeanor Medicare and Medicaid crimes or for patient abuse, (2)
felony convictions for health care fraud or violations relating to
controlled substances, (3) assessment of a civil monetary penalty
under sections 1128A and 1129 of the SSA, or (4) exclusion
from Medicare or Medicaid. However, under HIPAA, an individual may be excluded only if the entity's acts fall within (1)
and (2) above. Third, under the 1980s provision, exclusion of an
entity controlled by a sanctioned individual does not depend on
the culpability of either the entity or the individual, while under
HIPAA, exclusion of an individual who controls a sanctioned
entity requires a showing of the individual's knowledge of the
actions, unless the individual is an officer or managing employee
of the entity.
Accordingly, individuals and entities must be cautious and selective when choosing their affiliates. Individuals at the officer
or management level who join entities previously sanctioned
may be subject to permissive exclusion, despite having no relationship with the entity at the time of the activities giving rise to
the sanction. Of course, an entity faces similar challenges in determining whether its officers, directors, agents, or managing
employees may fall within the category of sanctioned individuals
who may expose the entity to permissive exclusion. This result
is particularly discouraging for sanctioned entities that wish to
clean house and bring in new officers and managers to operate
the entity according to Medicare and Medicaid laws and regulations. Because of these challenges for organizations and their
management,.it is increasingly important for organizations to establish methods to promote compliance with federal and state
laws to minimize civil and criminal exposure for both the organization and its management personnel.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-3(a)(3) (1995) defines a "person with an ownership or control interest" as a person who:
(A)(i) has directly or indirectly (as determined by the Secretary in regulations) an ownership interest of 5 per centum or more in the entity; or
(ii) is the owner of a whole or part interest in any mortgage, deed of trust,
note, or other obligation secured (in whole or in part) by the entity or any of
the property or assets thereof, which whole or part interest is equal to or
exceeds 5 per centum of the total property and assets of the entity; or
(B) is an officer or director of the entity, if the entity is organized as a corporation; or
(C) is a partner in the entity, if the entity is organized as a partnership.
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Civil Monetary Penalties Are Applied to Those Excluded
from the Programs

The provision in HIPAA allowing the government to impose
civil monetary penalties requires careful study. In addition to
the changes in the intent standard and the amount of the penalty
the government may assess, as described in section I(E) above,
this section of HIPAA subjects a new group of individuals to
these penalties. Specifically, the government may assess civil
penalties 6° against an individual (1) who is excluded from the
Medicare or Medicaid programs pursuant to the civil monetary
penalties provisions61 or the permissive or mandatory exclusion
provisions, 62 and (2)who, at the time of a violation of the civil
monetary penalties provisions, (a) retained "a direct or indirect
ownership or control interest in an entity" participating in the
Medicare or Medicaid programs, and who knew or should have
known "of the action constituting the basis for the exclusion," or
(b) is "an officer or managing employee ... of such an entity
"63

While this language sounds similar to that found in the new
permissive exclusion section, several phrases in the civil monetary penalties provision do not appear in the permissive exclusion section, creating confusion regarding the provision's
meaning and application. 64 Often the legislature drafts an act
60. Under the civil monetary penalties provision, the individual may be subject to
a $10,000 penalty for each day the prohibited relationship occurs. HIPAA § 231(c)(2)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)).
61. Exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs is an option available in
the same proceeding as the assessment of civil monetary penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-

7a(a) (1995).
62. Id. § 1320a-7 (1995).
63. HIPAA § 231(b) (to be codified at U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(4)).
64. The exact language is as follows:
Any person (including an organization, agency or other entity, but excluding
a beneficiary, as defined in subsection (i)(5) of this section) that

(4) in the case of a person who is not an organization, agency, or other entity, is excluded from participating in a program under title XVIII [of the
Social Security Act] or a State health care program in accordance with this
subsection or under section 1128 [42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7] and who, at the time
of a violation of this subsection(A) retains a direct or indirect ownership or control interest in an entity that
is participating in a program under title XVIII or a State health care program, and who knows or should know of the action constituting the basis for
the exclusion; or
(B) is an officer or managing employee (as defined in section 1126(b) [42
U.S.C. § 1320a-5(b)]) of such an entity; ....
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol6/iss1/5
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that when read carefully is subject to a variety of interpretations.
This is true of HIPAA. Given the various interpretations of the
civil monetary penalties provision, providers and their owners,
officers, and managing employees may feel uncertain with regard to their exposure to these penalties.
First, it seems that the government can impose penalties upon
an individual who has been excluded from the Medicare and
Medicaid programs based upon a violation of the civil monetary
penalties provisions or the permissive or mandatory exclusion
provisions. Second, there must be a violation of the civil monetary penalties provisions. However, it is unclear whether the
civil monetary penalty is in addition to the violation for which
the individual was excluded from the programs. If two separate
violations are not necessary, then the government can impose
these penalties for the same violation that led to its excluding
the individual. If only one violation is needed, it is curious that
HIPAA describes that violation inconsistently: first as an exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs based upon a
violation of either the civil monetary penalties provision or the
permissive or mandatory exclusion provisions, and then as a violation of only the civil monetary penalties provision, omitting
the references to the permissive and mandatory exclusion provisions. Also, because the owner must know (or have imputed
knowledge) of the action constituting the basis for the exclusion,
it would appear that the knowledge requirement in the civil
monetary penalties provision pertains to the activity causing the
individual's predicate exclusion, rather than any secondary violation of the civil monetary penalties provisions; in other words,
there is no required second violation. However, this analysis
would make the knowledge clause of the civil monetary penalties provision superfluous-the individual has been excluded,
and thus the individual's knowledge (actual or imputed) of the
violative action has been established; there is no need to reaffirm knowledge of the same action. It is possible, however, that
the knowledge requirement applies to an action causing a second violation of the civil monetary penalties provision by either
the individual or the entity that the individual owns or in which
the individual maintains a control interest.
This new civil monetary penalties provision can lead to various results based upon these various interpretations. For example, the provision could serve as a bar, or at a minimum a severe
HIPAA § 231(b)(4) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(4)).
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financial deterrent, to the retention of any ownership or control
interest in any entity participating in Medicare or Medicaid by
an individual who has been excluded from the programs. This
result follows an interpretation that the violation of the civil
monetary penalties provision and the knowledge clause pertain
to the individual's predicate exclusion. Such a result could be
particularly harmful to, for example, an individual who owns
several Medicare DME supply entities, only one of which committed acts that formed the basis for its exclusion from the
Medicare program. According to the new permissive exclusion
described in section II(A) above, the individual may be excluded for retaining an ownership interest in the sanctioned entity. Under one interpretation of HIPAA, the government may
subject the individual to penalties totaling $10,000 for each day
the individual retains an ownership interest in each of the other
Medicare DME supply entities, despite the fact that the other
supply entities have not committed any violations.65
Although not clear from the language of the civil monetary
penalties provision, a fairer interpretation of the new provision
is possible. An excluded individual is subject to penalties for
each day the individual retains an ownership or control interest
in an entity that, subsequent to the individual's exclusion, violated the civil monetary penalties provisions, if the excluded individual knows or should know of the action constituting the
basis for the entity's subsequent violation. Although the actual
language of the amended civil monetary penalties provision
does not clearly state this, this reasonable construction could not
be deemed unduly harsh. An excluded individual who retains
an ownership interest in a Medicare- or Medicaid-participating
entity that then violates the civil monetary penalties provision
cannot complain, particularly if the individual knew or should
have known of the action constituting the basis for the entity's
violation of the civil monetary penalties provision.
The expanded civil monetary penalties provision may lead to
the assessment of significant and broad-based penalties against
excluded individuals. Until the meaning and application of this
new section becomes clear, counsel must alert organizations and
their owners, officers, and managing employees of the various
possible interpretations.
65. Of course, these other supply entities also may be excluded from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs if the now-excluded ("sanctioned") individual's ownership
interest amounts to five percent or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(8) (1995).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol6/iss1/5
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C. FederalHealth Care Offenses: The Creation of New
Fraud Crimes66
Prior to HIPAA, criminal prosecution of offenses relating to
Medicare and Medicaid fraud was limited to those anti-kickback
and criminal false claims offenses delineated in the SSA or general fraud crimes, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and false statements. Many of these statutes only apply to Medicare and
Medicaid offenses and cannot be used to prosecute crimes
against other payers, such as private payers. In filling this void,
HIPAA substantially broadened the base of statutes available to
prosecute a variety of crimes relating to health care and extended their applicability to any health care benefit program. 67
Accordingly, HIPAA's amendments protect all payers, not just
Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs.
Indeed, the potential breadth of these statutes cannot be overstated, as frauds committed on Medicare and Medicaid are also
likely to be charged as violations of the new provisions under
HIPAA, including health care fraud, embezzlement, false statements, obstruction, and money laundering.
1. Health Care Fraud
This new offense of health care fraud criminalizes the knowing and willful execution or attempted execution of "a scheme
or artifice to defraud any health care benefit program" as well as
the obtaining by false pretenses of any money or property
"owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care
benefit program, in connection with the delivery or payment for
health care benefits, items, or services .

. . . "68

Violations are

punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to ten years. If the
violation results in serious bodily injury, the term of imprisonment increases to twenty years; if it leads to death, the term is
life in prison.6 9 The language of this statute is similar to that of

the mail/wire fraud statutes70 and, thus, it is likely that the case

66. The text for this section is reprinted with modifications from Dennis Barry,
Statutory Authorities/Prosecutions,in HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE: AREAS OF RISK
AND EFFECTnVE PROGRAMS 13-15 (American Acad. of Healthcare Att'ys ed., 1996)
with the permission of the American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys and Dennis

Barry, a partner in the author's firm.
67. A health care benefit program is defined to include any public or private plan
or contract under which medical benefits, items, or services are provided to any indi-

vidual.
68.
69.
70.

HIPAA § 241(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 24(b)).
HIPAA § 242 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1347).
HIPAA § 242.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1342 (1995).
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law broadly interpreting those provisions will apply to this new
statute. Fines paid pursuant to a conviction under this section
will go to the Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust
Fund.7 '
2.

Embezzlement of Health Care Funds

Any person who knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or
converts or intentionally misapplies any of the funds, assets, or
property of a health care benefit program violates this provision.
Offenses are punishable by fine or imprisonment of up to ten
years, but if the value of the embezzled property does not exceed $100, the term of imprisonment is not more than one
year. 72
3. False Statements Relating to Health Care
Any person who, in any matter involving a health care benefit
program, (a) knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up a material fact, or makes a false statement or representation regarding a material fact, or makes or uses any materially
false document knowing it to be false (b) in connection with the
delivery of or payment for health care benefits (c) shall be fined
and/or imprisoned for up to five years." Modeled on the False
Statements Act, 74 this statute is extremely broad. Intent to defraud is not an element of the offense; the only criminal intent
required is the knowing and willful making of a false statement
relating to health care benefits or services intended to induce
action by the person to whom the statement is made. As with
the False Statements Act, this new statute has broad implications and, in the context of health care, may have unintended
consequences.
4.

Obstruction of Criminal Investigations of Health
Care Offenses

Any person who willfully prevents, obstructs, misleads, delays, or attempts to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or delay the communication of information or records relating to a violation of a
federal health care offense to a criminal investigator shall be
71.
72.
73.
74.

HIPAA § 242(b).
HIPAA § 243(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 669).
HIPAA § 244 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1035).
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1995).
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fined and/or imprisoned for up to five years. 75 A "criminal investigator" is defined as any person authorized by a federal
agency to conduct or engage in investigations of potential health
care violations. 76 This statute is likely to be used by investigators and/or prosecutors to impede attempts by health care
providers and their attorneys to "manage" government investigations. Therefore, health care providers should be counseled
to think twice about instructing employees not to cooperate with
federal investigators and to be scrupulous about preserving
records once an investigation has commenced or is likely to
commence. Of course, legitimate efforts to limit the scope of a
subpoena, keep investigators within the bounds of a search warrant, or inform employees about their rights and obligations in
dealing with government investigators should not run afoul of
this statute.
5. Money Laundering of Proceeds of Health Care Offenses
This provision brings federal health care offenses within the
definition of a "specified unlawful activity" in the money laundering statute.77 A person commits a money laundering offense
by engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of
"specified unlawful activity," knowing of the source of the proceeds, with the intent to (1) promote the unlawful activity, (2)
conceal the source of the proceeds, or (3) evade federal tax laws
or currency reporting requirements.78 Money laundering may
have broad application to the field of health care. For example,
reinvesting funds acquired by a violation of the anti-kickback
provision in a medical practice could potentially be prosecuted
on a money laundering theory.
6.

Injunctive Authority Relating to Health Care Offenses

This provision authorizes a federal prosecutor to bring a civil
action to enjoin a person or entity committing or about to commit a federal health care offense.79 In addition, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action to freeze the assets of a person
or entity engaged in committing a federal health care offense to
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

HIPAA § 245(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1518(a)).
HIPAA § 245(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1518(b)).
HIPAA § 246 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F)).
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1997).
HIPAA § 247(a)(1)(C) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1)(C)).
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prevent the dissipation or alienation of assets potentially subject
to fines or forfeiture.80
7. Administrative Subpoena Authority Relating to Health
Care Investigations
This provision authorizes the Attorney General to issue a subpoena for documents, records, or other tangible things in an investigation of a federal health care offense. Also, a records
custodian may be compelled to testify regarding the production
and authentication of documents."' Unlike a grand jury subpoena, however, this administrative subpoena is not self-executing. If challenged, the prosecutor must seek enforcement of the
subpoena in court. 82 Failure to obey a court order enforcing
the subpoena is punishable as contempt.83 Persons who comply
in good faith with a subpoena issued pursuant to this provision84
are immune from civil liability for disclosure of information,
and individualized health information disclosed pursuant to such
a subpoena must be kept confidential. 85 However, there does
not appear to be any minimum cause threshold for issuing a subpoena. Thus, the new authority resulting from this provision
may be used to engage in "fishing expeditions," which courts
view with disfavor. In essence, this provision gives the Department of Justice and the FBI the same administrative subpoena
power as the OIG.
III.

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PLANS

As illustrated above, a violation of the fraud and abuse provisions as amended by HIPAA can carry with it devastating results. Now, more than ever, it is important for a health care
entity to institute a corporate compliance plan.86 A corporate
compliance plan that is properly conceived, implemented, and
enforced can provide health care entities with a useful tool to
avoid penalties and possible exclusion from the Medicare and
80.

HIPAA § 247(b) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2)).

81. HIPAA § 248(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)).
82. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3484, FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g), with HIPAA § 248(a) (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c)).

83. HIPAA § 248(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c)).
84. HIPAA § 248(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(d)).

85. HIPAA § 248(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e)).
86. For an explanation of a corporate compliance plan, see Thomas E. Bartrum &
L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care Compliance Programs,6
ANNALS HEALTH

L. 51 (1997).
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Medicaid programs, and to help assure that the entity's employees and representatives are complying with applicable laws. Despite the benefits of a corporate compliance plan, many entities
fear that any documents or findings generated from the corporate compliance plan are not privileged.87 A health care entity
must weigh the pros and cons with counsel to determine the best
course. Now with HIPAA, the pros may greatly outweigh the
cons.
A corporate compliance plan is a formal and comprehensive
set of policies and procedures designed and implemented to ensure that an organization and its employees consistently comply
with all applicable laws and regulations pertaining to its business
activities. Corporate compliance plans may take many forms,
ranging from a single policy statement to a detailed procedural
manual. The specific purposes and benefits of a corporate compliance plan vary among organizations, but generally include:
(1) providing an organization with a formal means to monitor
and control employee behavior;
(2) protecting the financial security for employees and the organization by identifying and correcting conduct that
might otherwise carry severe financial consequences;
(3) furnishing a mechanism or structure to disseminate
quickly and efficiently information relating to changes in
government regulations;
(4) educating the organization on the manner in which it conducts its business, which can foster the development of
strategies to reduce the costs of providing services;
(5) improving the ability of the organization to respond to a
claim that it has failed to comply with applicable laws;
(6) establishing a structure that encourages employees to report internally their concerns; and
(7) creating a mechanism to collect, retain, and disseminate
information, and to preserve the attorney-client
privilegem
Regardless of the form or the variety of benefits available
from a corporate compliance plan, many organizations implement a plan for the primary purpose of minimizing exposure to
both civil and criminal liability and sanctions. However, an or87. For a review of the self-evaluative privilege as it applies to corporate compliance plans, see Thomas F. O'Neil III & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege:A Primerfor Health Care Lawyers, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 33 (1996).
88. Daniel Roach, Elements of an Effective Compliance Program, in HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE:

AREAS OF RISK AND EFFEcnvE PROGRAMS

340 (American

Acad. of Healthcare Att'ys ed., 1996).
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ganization may not attain this goal without a comprehensive and
systematic method of identifying and addressing areas of risk,
educating personnel, auditing or measuring the plan's effectiveness, solving problems as they arise, enforcing the plan, reporting violations, and swiftly disciplining violators. These plans not
only can assist the health care entity in avoiding both criminal
and civil violations, but, as explained below, can serve as a basis
for a reduced criminal penalty if a violation occurs.
A. Criminal Liability
The United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") 8 9 offer a strict structure for federal judges to sentence individuals or
entities convicted of federal crimes, giving judges very little discretion in determining the sentence. However, the Guidelines
allow the court to reduce criminal sanctions-that is, corporate
probation and fines-against a corporation that maintains an effective corporate compliance plan. For example, a court can order corporate probation (for a felony, from one to five years) if,
among other things, an organization having fifty or more employees does not have an effective corporate compliance plan. 90
Corporate probation may consist of court-ordered (1) publication of the nature of the offense in the format and media specified by the court; (2) institution of a corporate compliance plan
in a form determined by the court; and (3) submission by the
organization to unannounced examinations of its books and
records9 and interrogation of "knowledgeable individuals" within
the organization. 91 Thus, the existence of an effective corporate
compliance plan can prove extremely helpful at the time of
sentencing.
With regard to the court's imposition of fines, corporate compliance plans play an important role. The Guidelines establish a
range of fines for each offense, the calculation of which involves
a base fine multiplied by a culpability score; this score can be
lower if the corporation maintains an effective corporate compliance plan. That base level corresponds to a particular fine.
To establish the range of fines the court can impose, the base
fine is multiplied by minimum and maximum multipliers, which
relate to the entity's culpability level. Each entity begins with a
culpability level of five, which requires that the base fine be
89.
90.
91.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

(1995).

Id. at § 8D1.1(3).
Id. at § 8D1.4.
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multiplied by one and by two to obtain the minimum and maximum fines available for the offense. However, the culpability
level may be increased for aggravating circumstances, 92 corresponding to higher minimum and maximum multipliers, or decreased for mitigating circumstances, corresponding to lower
minimum and maximum multipliers. Mitigating circumstances
include the existence of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law (a corporate compliance plan) or the willingness of the corporation to report its own violation (selfreporting).93 For example, a conviction of filing false Medicare
claims that caused a loss to the Medicare program totaling $2000
would correspond to a base fine level of twelve. The base fine
for this action would be $40,000. Without an effective corporate
compliance plan, and assuming no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the entity would receive a culpability score of five,
with a minimum-maximum multiplier range of one to two. The
fine would be no less than $40,000 and no more than $80,000. If
the entity had an effective corporate compliance plan in place,
its culpability score would drop from five to two, which provides
for a minimum multiplier of 0.4 ($16,000) and a maximum multiplier of 0.8 ($32,000). Thus, the existence of an effective corporate compliance plan could reduce the criminal fine by as much
as sixty percent.
Only a corporate compliance plan that is an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" can be used to as a
mitigating circumstance. 94 The Guidelines state that it must be
reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. The hallmark of an effective program is that the
organization exercises due diligence in its attempt to prevent
95
and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents.
92. Aggravating circumstances include involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by high-level personnel, prior criminal history, violation of a judicial order, and
obstruction of justice. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)-(e).

93. Id. § 8C2.5(f)-(g).
94. Id. § 8A1.2. The existence of an effective corporate compliance plan will not
reduce criminal fines if high-level personnel or an individual responsible for the administration or enforcement of the corporate compliance plan participated in, condoned, or willfully ignored the offense. "Participation in an offense by an individual
within substantial authority results in a rebuttable presumption that the organization
did not have an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law." Id.
§ 8C2.5(0.
95.

Id.
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Due diligence requires at a minimum that the organization take
the following steps:
(1) The organization must establish compliance standards and
procedures to be followed by its employees and other
agents that are reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct;
(2) Specific high-level personnel of the organization must be
assigned overall responsibility to oversee compliance with
such standards and procedures;
(3) The organization must use due care not to delegate substantial discretionary authority to individuals who the organization knew or should have known through the
exercise of due diligence had a propensity to engage in illegal activities;
(4) The organization must take steps to communicate effectively its standards and procedures to all employees and
other agents by, for example, requiring participation in
training programs or disseminating publications that explain in a practical manner what is required;
(5) The organization must take reasonable steps to achieve
compliance with its standards by, for example, using monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect
criminal conduct by its employees and other agents and
having in place and publicizing a reporting system that allows employees and other agents to report criminal conduct by others within the organization without fear of
retribution;
(6) The standards must be consistently enforced through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate, adequate discipline of individuals responsible for the
failure to detect an offense; the form of discipline that is
appropriate is case specific; and
(7) After an offense is detected, the organization must take all
reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense
and to prevent further similar offenses, including any necessary modifications to its program to prevent and detect
violations of law.96
The new crimes created by HIPAA, in addition to the existing
Medicare and Medicaid crimes, grant prosecutors ample ammunition to punish both individuals and organizations convicted of
health care fraud crimes involving both public and private payers. By following these due diligence steps in designing, implementing, and enforcing a corporate compliance plan, health care
96. Id.
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entities can benefit in two ways. First, a corporate compliance
plan should decrease the risk of criminal activity by establishing
an environment in which violations of law are not tolerated and
all employees are encouraged and advised that, as a condition of
employment, immediate and internal reporting of all indiscretions is required. Second, as explained above, the existence of
an effective plan may mitigate the criminal sanctions to be
imposed.
B. Civil Liability
While there exists no specific guideline, regulation, or statute
that provides for a reduction in civil penalties based upon the
existence of a corporate compliance plan, an effective plan built
and enforced along the principles of the Guidelines could minimize the organization's exposure to various civil liabilities and
sanctions.97 Even if a violation occurs, counsel can argue that
just as with criminal penalties, civil penalties should be reduced,
an argument that may prove fruitful in negotiations.
CONCLUSION

Due to the existence of fraud and abuse in the health care
industry, Congress expanded the weapons available to fight
fraud and reduce waste. Nonetheless, the severe liability and
sanctions created by HIPAA's permissive exclusions, civil monetary penalties, and fraud crimes should give pause to all health
care providers. HIPAA's new fraud-fighting mechanisms address interrelationships whereby violations committed by an individual or entity can trigger a domino effect of exclusion,
assessment of civil monetary penalties, and criminal prosecution
of affiliated individuals and entities.
Given the areas of subjective interpretation and the harsh
penalties, health care provider organizations should consider the
benefits of a corporate compliance plan to limit overall civil and
criminal liability exposure to the organization and the dindividuals with whom they associate. An effective plan that prevents
and detects violations of law may serve to minimize a variety of
activities that could lead to civil liability or criminal punishment.
In addition, an effective plan is considered a mitigating factor
97. Among the civil liabilities that may be avoided or minimized through the implementation and enforcement of a corporate compliance plan are federal False
Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1995)) and Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1995)) liabilities.
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that operates to reduce criminal fines pursuant to the Guidelines. If the sanctions available under prior law have failed to
inspire a health care organization to implement a corporate
compliance plan, HIPAA should provide sufficient motivation.
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HIPAA's CHANGES TO THE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS
Subject
Programs subject to the
laws

Before HIPAA
• Medicare and state health
care programs

After HIPAA
• All federally and statefunded health care prorams except the Federal
Employee Health Benefit
Plan

Mandatory exclusion from
Medicare for conviction of
certain crimes (state or
federal)

* Medicare-related crimes

Adds:
* Health care fraud felony
crimes created by HIPAA
* Crimes relating to the
unlawful manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, or dispensing of controlled
substances

Permissive exclusion from
Medicare for conviction of
certain crimes (state or federal) or other related state
action

Permissive exclusion for those
who are subject to the following state or federal actions or
for those entities that are controlled by those who are subject to the following:
* Finding of guilt for
Fraud
Obstruction of investigation
Prohibited manufacture,
distribution, prescription, or dispensing of
controlled substance
Excessive charges or
charges for unnecessary
services
Kickbacks under SSA
§§ 1128A, 1128B, 1129
Failure to disclose
required information
Failure to supply information on subcontractors
and suppliers
Failure to supply payment
information
Failure to grant immediate access to the Secretary
Failure to take corrective
action
" Revocation of license
" Exclusion or suspension
from any federal or state
health care program
* Default on educational
loans

Adds permissive exclusion for
those who commit any of the
following, for those who control a sanctioned entity and
knew or should have known of
the action that is the basis for
the conviction of the entity, or
for those who are officers or
managing employees of the
sanctioned entity:
" Health care fraud misdemeanor crimes created by
HIPAA
" Misdemeanor controlled
substances violations
* Felony controlled substances violations now
require exclusion

At the Secretary's discretion

Mandatory exclusion periods:
" Minimum exclusion of three
years for convictions of
fraud crimes, obstruction
violations, or controlled
substances violations
" Minimum exclusion of the
same time as a license revocation

Length of permissive exclusion

- Patient abuse crimes
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HIPAA's CHANGES TO THE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS (CONTINUED)
Subject

Civil monetary penalties

Illegal remuneration/anti-kickback exceptions

Before HIPAA

Amount:
* $2000 per item claimed

Those subject to penalties:
* Violators of the penalties provisions
Intent Standard:
* Knew or should have known
of the actions constituting the
violation
Exception for qualified group
purchasing arrangements and
bone fide employment relationships

Penalties against beneficiaries
under Medicare or Medicaid
for criminal false claims

Technically within anti-kickback
and/or criminal false claims

Adverse action data collection

None

Specific federal health care
fraud crimes

Fraud and Abuse Control
Program
Medicare Integrity Program

Beneficiary Incentive Program

Manner by which safe
harbors are established

Availability of advisory opinions

After HIPAA
* Minimum one year exclusion
if convicted for excessive
charges or unnecessary services
Amount
* $10,000 per item claimed
* Greater of $5000 or treble
damages paid for false home
health certification
* $10,000 per day that an
excluded individual retains an
ownership interest in a Medicare/Medicaid-participating
entity
Those subject to penalties:
* Adds those excluded who violate the penalties provisions
Intent Standard:
* Adds definition for knew or
should have known
Adds exception for risk-sharing
arrangements, as defined by
HIPAA
Criminal penalty for fraudulent
disposition of assets to qualify for
Medicaid

Data base to report final adverse
actions such as civil judgments,
criminal convictions, license revocation, and exclusion from
Medicare/Medicaid
Anti-kickback provisions and Adds new federal crimes for
criminal false claims under SSA
fraud, theft, embezzlement, false
statements, obstruction of investigation, and money laundering
relating to both public and private health care programs
None
Control program coordinates
federal, state, and local health
care anti-fraud programs
None
Allows HHS to contract with private entities to carry out fraud
and abuse detection
None
Monetary incentive for beneficiaries to report fraudulent activity and provide program
efficiency suggestions
At the Secretary's discretion pur- Secretary must solicit and create
suant to the Medicare and Medi- new safe harbors and fraud alerts
caid Patient and Program
Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, § 14, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b.
None
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